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In recent macroeconomic theory, relative price variability (RPV) generates the
central distortions of in°ation. This paper provides ¯rst evidence on the empirical
relation between in°ation and RPV in the euro area focusing on threshold e®ects
of in°ation. We ¯nd that expected in°ation signi¯cantly increases RPV if in°ation
is either very low (below -1.38% p.a.) or very high (above 5.94% p.a.). In the
intermediate regime, however, expected in°ation has no distorting e®ects which
supports price stability as an outcome of optimal monetary policy.
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JEL classi¯cation: E31, C23 
Non Technical Summary 
There is now a general consensus that inflation produces welfare costs and price 
stability should be the prior goal of monetary policy. In this regard, recent 
macroeconomic theory emphasizes the distorting impact of inflation on the information 
content of nominal prices. If inflation causes a suboptimal adjustment of goods prices 
due to price adjustment costs or imperfect information, then inflation increases relative 
price variability (RPV), reduces the transparency of the relative price mechanism and 
impedes the efficient allocation of resources.  
The bulk of the empirical literature deals with the linear relationship between inflation 
and RPV implying that the marginal impact of inflation on RPV does not depend on the 
inflation level. However, the impact of inflation on the economy might be non-linear. 
As the empirical literature on the link between inflation and long-term growth shows, 
the effect of inflation on growth changes if inflation is above certain threshold values of 
inflation. Moreover, the European Central Bank, for example, defines price stability as 
an inflation rate below but close to the critical level of 2%.  
Accounting for a potential non-linear impact of inflation on the economy, this study 
provides evidence on the empirical relation between inflation and RPV in the euro area 
focusing on threshold effects of inflation. The application of panel threshold models 
allows to test for the number of inflation  thresholds and to estimate both the threshold 
levels as well as the marginal impact of inflation on RPV for the various threshold 
levels of inflation. The empirical results show that threshold effects of inflation can be 
confirmed for the inflation-RPV nexus in the euro area. In addition to a linear impact of 
unexpected inflation, there is strong evidence in favor of a non-linear influence of 
expected inflation on RPV. We find that expected inflation significantly increases RPV 
if price changes are either clearly negative (< -1.4% p.a.) or very high (> 5.9% p.a.). 
Between these two thresholds expected inflation has according to our estimations no 
real effects on the economy via its impact on RPV (but may have other effects). 
Therefore, threshold effects of inflation provide a further rational for the announcement 
of critical levels of inflation and inflation target zones.  
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Mittlerweile ist es nahezu unstrittig, dass Inflation volkswirtschaftliche Kosten 
verursacht und deshalb Preisstabilität das vorrangige Ziel moderner Geldpolitik sein 
muss. Begründet wird dies in der aktuellen makroökonomischen Theorie vor allem mit 
einem störenden Einfluss von Inflation auf den Informationsgehalt von Preisen. Werden 
bei Inflation die Güterpreise aufgrund von Preisänderungskosten oder unvollständiger 
Information nicht optimal angepasst, erhöht Inflation die relative Preisvariabilität 
(RPV), senkt die Transparenz des relativen Preismechanismus und verhindert so eine 
effiziente Allokation von Ressourcen. 
Die empirische Literatur zum Einfluss von Inflation auf die Variabilität der relativen 
Preise unterstellte bislang stets einen linearen Zusammenhang, infolge dessen der 
marginale Effekt  von Inflation auf die relative Preisvariabilität unabhängig vom Niveau 
der Inflationsrate ist. Doch Ergebnisse aus der empirischen Literatur zum Einfluss von 
Inflation auf das langfristige Wachstum zeigen, dass Inflation besonders schädlich ist, 
wenn sie bestimmte Schwellenwerte (Thresholds) überschreitet. Auch die Europäische 
Zentralbank sieht Preisstabilität als gewährleistet an, wenn die Preissteigerungsrate nahe 
aber unter dem kritischen Wert von 2% liegt.  
Diese Studie untersucht erstmals die empirische Relevanz von Schwellenwerten der 
Inflation für die Wirkung von Inflation auf die Variabilität der relativen Preise in der 
Eurozone mit Hilfe eines Panel-Threshold-Modells. Das Panel-Threshold-Modell 
ermöglicht dabei die Bestimmung der Anzahl der Schwellenwerte für Inflation, die 
Schätzung der Threshold-Höhe sowie die Schätzung des marginalen Einflusses der 
Inflation auf die relative Preisvariabilität in Abhängigkeit von der Inflationshöhe. Die 
Ergebnisse für die Eurozone zeigen, dass es neben einem linearen Zusammenhang 
zwischen unerwarteter Inflation und relativer Preisvariabilität auch einen nichtlinearen 
Zusammenhang zwischen der erwarteten Inflation und der relativen Preisvariabilität 
gibt. Insbesondere besitzt die erwartete Preisänderung nur dann einen positiven Einfluss 
auf die relative Preisvariabilität, wenn sie deutlich negativ (<-1.4% p.a.) oder sehr hoch 
(>5.9% p.a.) gewesen ist. Bei Inflationsraten, die zwischen diesen beiden 
Schwellenwerten liegen, erzeugt die erwartete Inflation nach unseren Rechnungen keine 
realen Effekte über ihren Einfluss auf die relative Preisvariabilität (was andere Effekte  
nicht ausschließt). Das Vorliegen von Schwellenwert-Effekten in der Wirkung von 
Inflation auf RPV liefert damit ein empirisches Argument für die Orientierung der 
Geldpolitik an Inflationszielen oder bestimmten Ober- und Untergrenzen für die 
Inflationsrate. Contents
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1 Introduction
A large number of economic arguments point to the bene¯ts of price stability and
the welfare cost of in°ation. Recent macroeconomic theory emphasizes the distorting
impact of in°ation on relative prices. In particular, standard new Keynesian dynamic
general equilibrium models with staggered price setting support price stability as an
outcome of optimal monetary policy mainly because in°ation increases relative price
variability (RPV), see e.g. Woodford (2003) or Gali (2003).1 In spite of the crucial
role of in°ation's impact on RPV, the empirical relevance of this relation is not very
well researched. This paper contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on
the relation between in°ation and relative price variability in the European Monetary
Union (EMU).
Since the in°uential paper by Parks (1978), several studies have provided evidence in
favor of a signi¯cant impact of in°ation on RPV for the US (see e.g. Grier and Perry
(1996), Parsley (1996), Debelle and Lamont (1997), Jaramillo (1999), Chang and Cheng
¤Department of Money and Macroeconomics, Mertonstr. 17, D-60054 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
e-mail: nautz@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de; miszler@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de. We thank Matei Demetrescu,
JÄ org DÄ opke, Uwe Hassler, Heinz Herrmann, Johannes Ho®mann, and the participants of the research
seminar at the Bundesbank for helpful comments and suggestions. The research for this paper was
partly conducted while Juliane Schar® was visiting the Economic Research Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank. She is grateful for the research department's kind hospitality.
1 Reducing the information content of nominal prices, in°ation drives a wedge between marginal rates
of transformation and substitution. Therefore, as Green (2005, p.132) put it, price dispersion is "the
root of all evil" caused by in°ation in these models.
1(2002)), as well as for various European countries for the pre-EMU period (Fielding
and Mizen (2000), Silver and Ioannidis (2001), Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2005), Nautz
and Schar® (2005)). While some allow for a speci¯c role of expected and unexpected
in°ation, a common feature of all these contributions is that they restrict the attention
to linear relationships implying that the marginal impact of in°ation on RPV does
not depend on the in°ation level. However, the impact of in°ation on the economy
might be non-linear. Bruno and Easterly (1998), for example, showed that the e®ect
of in°ation on growth changes if in°ation is above a threshold level of 40%. Therefore,
advancing on simple linear relationships, the use of threshold models seems a plausible
¯rst step for a deeper analysis of the relation between in°ation and RPV.
A ¯rst attempt to model a non-linear relation between in°ation and RPV can be found
in Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003) who consider the in°ation-RPV nexus for Turkish
provinces. In Turkey there has been an obvious break in the in°ation process around
1976. Therefore, Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003) simply divide the sample in a high and
a low in°ation period and estimate the RPV equation for the two periods separately.
As a result, they neither estimate the threshold level of in°ation nor the number of
in°ation regimes. Obviously, this approach should not be applied to recent euro area
data where both the number of in°ation thresholds as well as the exact threshold levels
are unclear.
Moreover, in the threshold model applied by Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003) all Turkish
provinces are, by construction, always in the same in°ation regime. However, while the
ECB's monetary policy is one and indivisible for the euro area as a whole, in°ation
di®erentials across EMU member countries have been considerable. Therefore, although
there does not exist any regional monetary policy such that EMU member countries
are always in the same monetary policy regime, the assumption that all countries are
always in the same in°ation regime is too restrictive. In the following, the number
of in°ation regimes will be determined empirically by the number of thresholds in the
2RPV-in°ation equation.
With a view to these problems, the panel threshold model introduced by Hansen (1999,
2000) is a natural candidate for the analysis of the non-linear impact of in°ation on
RPV in the euro area. The application of the panel threshold model enables us to test
for the number of in°ation regimes and to estimate both the threshold levels as well as
the marginal impact of in°ation on RPV in the various regimes. Finally, the threshold
model also allows di®erent countries to be in di®erent in°ation regimes.
Threshold models have already been applied in the empirical literature on the link
between in°ation and long-term growth. In line with the earlier ¯ndings of Bruno
and Easterly (1998), Tsionas and Christopoulos (2003) estimate a threshold e®ect of
in°ation in the in°ation-growth relationship for the European Union. Cuaresma and
Silgoner (2004) also investigate European data and identify even two thresholds for
in°ation and, thus, three di®erent in°ation regimes. A general conclusion of this lit-
erature is that the costs of in°ation are particularly signi¯cant if in°ation exceeds a
certain threshold. Compared to usual in°ation targets set in industrial countries, these
thresholds are often found to be extremely high. For example, Cuaresma and Silgoner
(2004) estimate the upper threshold of in°ation to be around 16% p.a.
Our empirical results show that threshold e®ects of in°ation can be con¯rmed for
the in°ation-RPV nexus in the euro area. In addition to a linear impact of unexpected
in°ation, there is strong evidence in favor of a hump-shaped e®ect of expected in°ation.
The strongest marginal impact on RPV is estimated for in°ation rates below zero
followed by a range of in°ation where no signi¯cant e®ect of expected in°ation on
RPV prevails. Beyond the upper threshold there is again a positive e®ect of expected
in°ation. Interestingly, the estimated threshold level de¯ning high in°ation ranges
between 3% and 6% p.a. In this respect, our empirical results obtained for the relation
between in°ation and RPV support the proposition that price stability should be the
outcome of optimal monetary policy.
3The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data and the RPV measure
based on the harmonized index of consumer prices and provides ¯rst evidence on the
linear relation between in°ation and RPV in the euro area. We discuss the role of ex-
pected versus unexpected in°ation and determine core in°ation as the relevant in°ation
measure for the in°ation-RPV analysis. The empirical literature on a non-linear impact
of in°ation on RPV is reviewed in Section 3 while Section 4 describes the econometrics
of the panel threshold model by Hansen (1999, 2000). The empirical results of the
panel threshold analysis for the euro area are presented in Section 5. Section 6 gives a
brief summary of our main results and o®ers some conclusions.
2 The linear relation between in°ation and RPV in the
euro area
2.1 Data
The following empirical analysis of the link between in°ation and RPV in the euro area
employs monthly data for various subcategories of the harmonized index of consumer
prices (HICP) provided by the Eurostat database. In the member states of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union, the harmonized indices of consumer prices provide a complete
set of comparable and high-quality consumer price indices. Moreover, the ECB uses
the euro area HICP to assess price stability. Therefore, the HICP is a natural choice for
analyzing the in°ation-RPV link for EMU members in a panel context. The data set
contains seasonally adjusted data of twelve HICP subcategories for the EMU members
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain.2 The data are available since January 1995 and our sample ends in December
2003.
2 The HICP subcategories are food and non-alcoholic beverages; alcoholic beverages, tobacco and nar-
cotics; clothing and footwear; housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; furnishings, household
equipment and routine maintenance of the house; health; transport; communication; recreation and
culture; education; restaurants and hotels; miscellaneous goods and services. The sample does not
contain Belgium and Luxembourg due to restricted data availability.
4Figure 1: Minimum and maximum of headline in°ation
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Following the empirical literature (see e.g. Jaramillo (1999), Parsley (1996), Fielding
and Mizen (2000)), the variability of relative price changes for country i in period t
(RPVit) is de¯ned as the square root of the weighted sum of squared deviations of
subcategory-in°ation ¼ijt around the average in°ation for country i (¼it), i.e.
RPVit =
v u
u t
12 X
j=1
wijt(¼ijt ¡ ¼it)2
where ¼ijt = ¢lnPijt and Pijt is the price index of the jth subcategory in country
i in period t. wijt denotes the country-speci¯c weight of the jth subcategory in the
aggregate index so that Pit =
P12
j=1 wijtPijt gives the aggregate price level in country
i and the in°ation rate ¼it is ¢lnPit. Note that the country-speci¯c weights are not
time invariant but are adjusted on a yearly basis by Eurostat.
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Figure 1 shows the behavior of the annualized in°ation rate in the euro area. Accounting
for the in°ation di®erentials between the EMU member countries, Figure 1 also displays
two generated time series consisting of the minimum and maximum of the country-
speci¯c annualized in°ation rates across the EMU countries.3 The in°ation rate of
the euro area is more closely related to the behavior of the country-speci¯c minimum
in°ation. Since the mid-nineties, in°ation in the euro area has been at a moderate level
but there were also negative in°ation rates as well as relatively high in°ation in the
euro area countries. As the histogram of annualized in°ation rates in Figure 2 indicates,
25% of the observations are below an in°ation rate of 0.68% p.a. and above an in°ation
rate of 3.88% p.a., respectively. More than half of the in°ation observations exceed the
2% level.
The in°ation-RPV relation might be distorted by supply shocks which jointly deter-
mine headline in°ation and relative price variability. For example, if there is a positive
supply shock in a product market then there is a °uctuation in that product price.
3 The annualized in°ation rates and RPV measures for the 10 countries under investigation are dis-
played in Figure 3 in the Appendix.
6This will lead to an increase in both average in°ation and in the RPV measure. Con-
sequently, there is correlation between headline in°ation and the error term in the
regression implying that the aggregate in°ation can no longer be regarded as exoge-
nous. A possible solution to this endogeneity bias is the application of core in°ation as
explanatory variable, see e.g. Jaramillo (1999) or Bomberger and Makinen (1993).
Our measure of core in°ation is aggregate in°ation without food and energy prices,
i.e. prices that are particularly driven by supply side shocks. This in°ation measure
is also regularly monitored by the ECB, see e.g. ECB (2005). Core in°ation for the
ten countries is published by Eurostat and available from February 1996 onwards.
The time series for annualized core in°ation are displayed in Figure 4 in the Appendix.
Apparently, in°ation and core in°ation show a concurrent pattern. In most periods, the
di®erences between headline and core in°ation seem not very dramatic. In particular,
the coe±cient of correlation between monthly aggregate in°ation and core in°ation
over all countries is 0:63.4
Preannounced relative price changes increase RPV but are likely to be less distorting
for the information content of prices. Therefore, we account for all ascertainable an-
ticipated e®ects like e.g. the introduction of a tuition fee in Austria in October 2001.
Additionally, we capture major institutional changes like e.g. the introduction of the
Euro in January 1999 or the entrance of Greece to the European Monetary Union in
January 2001 by including dummy variables in the following regressions.
Panel unit root tests for monthly headline in°ation, core in°ation, and RPV indicate
that these time series have no individual or common unit root, see Table 5 in the
Appendix for detailed results. Con¯rming the evidence provided by e.g. LÄ unnemann
and MathÄ a (2004) or Hondroyiannis and Lazaretou (2004), in°ation persistence in the
euro area has declined in the end of the nineties.
4 The histogram of annualized core in°ation rates as well as the minimum and maximum core in°ation
rates are similar to the ¯gures of headline in°ation and are displayed in Figures 5 and 6, respectively,
in the Appendix.
7Table 1: The linear relation between in°ation and RPV
RPVit = ®i + ¯j¼itj + "it
headline in°ation core in°ation
b ¯ 0:46
(0:05)
¤¤ 0:59
(0:05)
¤¤
Exogeneity test (F-statistic) 8:01
[0:00]
1:01
[0:32]
¹ R2 0.24 0.24
Observations 1070 950
Countries 10 10
Notes:
¤¤ indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level. Standard errors are given in parentheses, p-
values in brackets. The exogeneity test is a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated
via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates.
2.2 In°ation and RPV: the basic relationship
Following Parsley's (1996) and Debelle and Lamont's (1997) analysis of the in°ation-
RPV link for US cities, let us begin with a simple least squares panel regression of RPV
on the absolute value of aggregate in°ation with country-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects ®i:5
RPVit = ®i + ¯j¼itj + "it: (1)
The results for the ¯xed-e®ects estimation (1) for the two alternative in°ation measures
are reported in Table 1. In both cases, in°ation has a signi¯cant and positive impact
on RPV.
However, the estimates based on headline in°ation have to be interpreted with caution.
In particular, the Davidson-MacKinnon exogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis of
5 Parsley (1996) and Debelle and Lamont (1997) also include time dummies to control for shocks
that hit all cities in a uniform manner. Since inclusion of time dummies does not alter our results
qualitatively, we only present results refering to estimations without time dummies. The regressions
of Equation (1) assume neither cross-section heteroskedasticity which allows for a di®erent residual
variance for each cross-section nor contemporaneous correlation between the cross-section residuals.
If we allow for cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation, the results do not
change substantially.
8exogeneity of headline in°ation at the 1% level.6 In contrast, the Davidson-McKinnon
test shows that there is no endogeneity bias if we use the absolute value of core in°ation.
Accordingly, the core in°ation rate is the appropriate in°ation measure for the following
empirical investigations.
2.3 Expected in°ation versus unexpected in°ation
The empirical results presented in the previous subsection showed that relative price
variability in Europe increases in in°ation. According to the simple linear speci¯ca-
tion (1), the impact of in°ation on RPV does not depend on in°ation expectations.
However, a di®erent role of expected and unexpected in°ation is not only found empir-
ically (Aarstol (1999), Nautz and Schar® (2005)) but also suggested by various theories
explaining the in°ation-RPV link.
Menu cost models by Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) or Rotemberg (1983) emphasize
a positive relationship between RPV and expected in°ation. If there are ¯xed cost
of price changes and ¯rm-speci¯c shocks, staggered price setting will be generated
and higher expected in°ation will amplify the dispersion of prices. In contrast, only
unexpected in°ation has an impact on RPV in signal-extraction models introduced
by Barro (1976) or Hercowitz (1981). In these models, individuals have di±culties
distinguishing between relative and aggregate price changes. Since in°ation uncertainty
hampers the distinction between relevant idiosyncratic and irrelevant aggregate demand
shocks, it becomes optimal for ¯rms to adjust output less in response to all shocks. As a
consequence of the implied misperceptions, prices have to move more in each market to
equate quantity demanded with the less variable quantity supplied. If price elasticities
of supply di®er across ¯rms, then RPV will respond to the magnitude of unexpected
in°ation.
6 The Davidson-MacKinnon test computes a test of exogeneity for a ¯xed-e®ect regression estimated
via instrumental variables, see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). A rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that endogenous regressors' e®ects on the estimates are meaningful, and instrumental
variables techniques are required.
9An obvious extension of the basic in°ation-RPV relationship is, therefore, to allow for
di®erent coe±cients on expected (¼e
it) and unexpected (¼it ¡ ¼e
it) in°ation:
RPVit = ®i + ¯1j¼e
itj + ¯2j¼it ¡ ¼e
itj + "it; (2)
where ®i are again the ¯xed e®ects for each country. Typically, the empirical literature
uses simple autoregressive time series representations to estimate in°ation forecasts.
Following e.g. Bomberger and Makinen (1993), Silver and Ioannidis (2001), Konieczny
and Skrzypacz (2005), we estimate expected and unexpected in°ation in Equation (2)
using an AR(12) core in°ation forecast for each country.
The ¯rst column of Table 2 shows the results for the ¯xed e®ects estimation of Equation
(2). In line with the ¯ndings for Germany obtained by Nautz and Schar® (2005), the
impact of unexpected in°ation is much stronger in the euro area. An F-Test of the
null hypothesis that the coe±cients on expected and unexpected in°ation are equal
indicates rejection at the 1% level. Nautz and Schar® (2005) argue that the in°uence of
expected in°ation in Germany disappears because a credible monetary policy stabilized
in°ationary expectations on a low level. In fact, Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2005)
establish a more pronounced e®ect of expected in°ation during the transition of Poland
from a planned to a market economy when in°ation expectations were relatively high.
For the US, Aarstol (1999) ¯nds that the e®ect of in°ation on RPV is more pro-
nounced when in°ation is unexpectedly high, i.e. when unexpected in°ation is positive.
Following this approach, we regress RPV on expected as well as positive and negative
unexpected in°ation:
RPVit = ®i + ¯1j¼e
itj + ¯2(¼it ¡ ¼e
it)+ + ¯3j(¼it ¡ ¼e
it)¡j + "it; (3)
where (¼it ¡ ¼e
it)+ = (¼it ¡ ¼e
it) if (¼it ¡ ¼e
it) ¸ 0 and (¼it ¡ ¼e
it)¡ = (¼it ¡ ¼e
it) if
(¼it¡¼e
it) · 0 (zero otherwise). The ¯xed e®ects estimation of Equation (3) is reported
in the second column of Table 2. The results indicate no rejection of the null hypothesis
that the coe±cients of positive and negative unexpected in°ation are equal. Thus, there
10Table 2: The e®ects of expected and unexpected in°ation on RPV
RPVit = ®i + ¯1j¼
e
itj RPVit = ®i + ¯1j¼
e
itj + ¯2(¼it ¡ ¼
e
it)
+
+¯2j¼it ¡ ¼
e
itj + "it +¯3j(¼it ¡ ¼
e
it)
¡j + "it
b ¯1 0:26
(0:09)
¤¤ 0:27
(0:09)
¤¤
b ¯2 1:13
(0:07)
¤¤ 1:06
(0:09)
¤¤
b ¯3 1:20
(0:09)
¤¤
F(b ¯1 = b ¯2) 50:88
[0:00]
F(b ¯2 = b ¯3) 1:85
[0:17]
¹ R2 0.34 0.34
Obs. 830 830
Countries 10 10
Notes: Expected and unexpected in°ation are based on a AR(12) forecast of core in°ation.
¤¤ indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level. Standard errors are given in parentheses, p-values in
brackets. F(b ¯i = b ¯j) indicates the F-statistic testing H0 : b ¯i = b ¯j.
is no evidence for an asymmetric impact of unexpected in°ation on RPV in Europe. As
a consequence, Equation (2) shall be regarded as a starting point for a deeper analysis
of the in°ation-RPV relationship.
3 The non-linear relation between in°ation and RPV
The previous section established a linear relationship between in°ation and RPV in the
European Monetary Union assuming that the signi¯cance and strength of the impact
of expected and unexpected in°ation do not depend on the level of in°ation. This
assumption is, however, debatable.
On the one hand, a linear in°uence of in°ation on RPV and, thus on welfare, seems
to be at odds with the non-linear behavior and strategies of many central banks. The
ECB, for example, de¯nes price stability as an in°ation rate "below but close to 2%".
As a consequence, the central bank's reaction to an increase in the in°ation rate from,
11say, 1% to 1.5%, may be qualitatively very di®erent from an increase from 2% to 2.5%.
Similar non-linear policy responses may be observed for in°ation reductions if in°ation
is already close to zero. This suggests that central banks' perception of the real e®ects
of in°ation assume certain threshold values of in°ation.
On the other hand, the (non-)linearity of the impact of in°ation on RPV is also dis-
cussed in the empirical literature. Since the early ¯ndings of Parks (1978) it has been
repeatedly suspected that the empirical evidence in favor of a positive link between
US in°ation and RPV might be only due to a few high in°ation periods, see Jaramillo
(1999).7 Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003) were the ¯rst who explicitly allowed the coef-
¯cient of in°ation to vary with the level of in°ation. They use panel data of Turkish
provinces and ¯nd that the impact of in°ation on RPV depends on the in°ation regime.
The following analysis of the non-linear impact of in°ation on RPV in Europe advances
in several dimensions on Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003).
First, Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003) divided the sample ad hoc in a high and a low
in°ation period. For Turkey, this pragmatic approach is appropriate because Turkey has
been through two distinct in°ationary periods after 1948. In fact, there is an obvious
structural break in the behavior and the average level of Turkish in°ation before and
after 1976. However, since the mid-nineties, the identi¯cation of di®erent in°ation
periods is not obvious for most European countries, compare Fig. 4. Second, Caglayan
and Filiztekin (2003) divide the observation period in a low and a high in°ation episode
uniformly for all cross-sectional units. As a consequence, all cross-section units are in
the same in°ation regime. For European countries, this assumption is not appropriate.
In fact, there have been substantial in°ation di®erentials between the member countries
of the EMU, i.e. di®erent European countries are probably in di®erent in°ation regimes.
Finally, with a view to the obvious break in the Turkish in°ation record Caglayan and
Filiztekin (2003) determine the number of thresholds and the threshold value itself
7 Note, however, that Nautz and Schar® (2005) found evidence for an impact of (unexpected) in°ation
on RPV even in Germany, the textbook example of a low-in°ation country.
12exogenously. Again, this research strategy should not be applied to European data,
since the existence and identi¯cation of distinct in°ationary episodes is far from obvious
for the relatively low in°ation rates observed in the European Monetary Union.
A natural candidate to solve many problems of the ad hoc approach applied in Caglayan
and Filiztekin (2003) is the panel threshold regression model introduced by Hansen
(1999, 2000). In that model, di®erent countries are not only allowed to be in di®erent
in°ation regimes. Hansen (1999, 2000) also provides tests for the number of thresholds
and estimates the threshold values, i.e. the critical in°ation levels where the impact of
in°ation on RPV changes. Therefore, Hansen's panel threshold model is an obvious ¯rst
step to analyze potential non-linearities in the impact of in°ation on RPV in Europe.
In the next section, the panel threshold model is introduced. Following Hansen (1999,
2000), we will brie°y review how to estimate and evaluate single and multiple panel
threshold models.
4 The Panel-Threshold-Model
4.1 The single threshold model
4.1.1 Estimation of a single threshold
This section introduces the panel threshold model by Hansen (1999, 2000). Starting
with the single threshold case, the equation for a balanced panel with threshold e®ects
is given as:
yit = ®i + ¯0
1xitI(qit · °) + ¯0
2xitI(qit > °) + "it; (4)
where I(¢) is an indicator function. The error term "it is independent and identically
distributed with zero mean and ¯nite variance ¾2. The subscript i stands for the cross-
sections with 1 · i · N and t indexes time (1 · t · T). The dependent variable yit
and the threshold variable qit are scalar, the regressor xit is a k-dimensional vector of
exogenous variables. xit and yit are assumed to be stationary variables. xit may contain
13variables with slope coe±cients constrained to be the same in the two regimes which
have no e®ect on the following distribution theory. If the threshold variable qit is below
or above a certain value of qit, namely °, then the regressor xit has a di®erent impact
on yit represented by coe±cients ¯1 6= ¯2. In many applications, the threshold variable
qit may be an element of xit but this is not necessarily the case. In our application yit
is RPV and a natural choice of qit is a measure of in°ation. xit contains expected and
unexpected in°ation.
Hansen (1999, 2000) chooses a ¯xed e®ects approach to estimate Equation (4). After
removing the individual speci¯c means ®i, the slope coe±cient ¯ can be estimated (for
given °) by ordinary least squares (OLS). Restating Equation (4) as:
yit = ®i + ¯0xit(°) + "it; (5)
where xit(°) =
µ
xitI(qit · °)
xitI(qit > °)
¶
and ¯ = (¯0
1 ¯0
2)0, the OLS estimator of ¯ is obtained
by
^ ¯(°) =
¡
X¤(°)0X¤(°)
¢¡1 X¤(°)0Y ¤: (6)
X¤ and Y ¤ denote the stacked data over all individuals after removing the individual
speci¯c means. The vector of regression residuals is ^ "¤(°) = Y ¤ ¡ X¤(°)^ ¯(°) and the
sum of squared errors can be written as
S1(°) = ^ "¤(°)0^ "¤(°) = Y ¤0 ³
I ¡ X¤(°)0 ¡
X¤(°)0X¤(°)
¢¡1 X¤(°)0
´
Y ¤: (7)
In a second step, Hansen (2000) suggests the estimation of the threshold ° by least
squares, implying
^ ° = argmin
°
S1(°): (8)
The resulting estimate for the slope coe±cient is obtained by ^ ¯ = ^ ¯(^ °). The residual
vector is ^ "¤ = ^ "¤(^ °) and the residual variance is de¯ned as
^ ¾2 =
1
N(T ¡ 1)
^ "¤0
^ "¤ =
1
N(T ¡ 1)
S1(^ °): (9)
144.1.2 Testing for a threshold
Having estimated the single threshold ^ °, it is important to check whether the threshold
is in fact statistically signi¯cant. Obviously, the null hypothesis "no threshold e®ect in
Equation (4)" is equivalent to
H0 : ¯1 = ¯2:
Note that standard tests have non-standard distributions, since under H0 the thresh-
old is not identi¯ed. For ¯xed-e®ects equations, Hansen (1996) therefore suggests a
bootstrap method to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio test.
Under the null hypothesis of no threshold, the model is
yit = ®i + ¯0
1xit + "it: (10)
After the ¯xed e®ects transformation, the equation can be written as
y¤
it = ¯0
1x¤
it + "¤
it: (11)
The OLS estimator of ¯1 is ~ ¯1, the residuals are ~ "¤
it and the sum of squared errors is
S0 = ~ "¤0
it ~ "¤
it. Then, the likelihood ratio test of H0 is based on the test statistic
F1 =
S0 ¡ S1(^ °)
^ ¾2 ; (12)
where ^ ¾2 is the residual variance de¯ned in (9). Hansen (1996) shows that a bootstrap
procedure achieves the ¯rst-order asymptotic distribution, so p-values constructed from
the bootstrap are asymptotically valid.
In the following, we adopt the bootstrap method by Hansen (1999) but modify the
procedure. Hansen (1999) has a large number of cross sections (N ! 1) but only a
few time periods. In contrast, the number of countries in our sample is ten but T is
large.8
8 Hansen (1999) groups the regression residuals by individual ^ "
¤
i = f^ "
¤
i1; ^ "
¤
i2;:::; ^ "
¤
iTg and takes the
sample f^ "
¤
1; ^ "
¤
2;:::; ^ "
¤
Ng with size N as the empirical distribution. Since N is limited but T is large in
our empirical analysis, we treat the sample f^ "
¤
11;:::; ^ "
¤
1T;:::; ^ "
¤
i1;:::; ^ "
¤
iT;:::; ^ "
¤
N1;:::; ^ "
¤
NTg as the
154.1.3 Con¯dence intervals for threshold estimate and slope coe±cients
In case of a threshold e®ect, i.e. ¯1 6= ¯2, the estimate ^ ° is consistent for the true value
of °, say °0. Since the asymptotic distribution of the threshold estimate ^ ° is highly
non-standard, Hansen (2000) uses the likelihood ratio statistic for tests on ° to form
con¯dence intervals for °. The null hypothesis is H0 : ° = °0 and the likelihood ratio
statistic is given by
LR1(°) =
S1(°) ¡ S1(^ °)
^ ¾2 : (13)
The null hypothesis is rejected for large values of LR1(°0). Hansen (2000) shows that
there is an asymptotic distribution for T ! 1 or N ! 1 to form valid asymptotic
con¯dence intervals for °.9 He demonstrates that the distribution function has the
inverse c(®) = ¡2ln(1 ¡
p
1 ¡ ®) from which it is easy to calculate critical values,
e.g. the 5% critical value is 7.35 and the 1% critical value is 10.59. The test rejects
the hypothesis H0 : ° = °0 at the asymptotic level ® if LR1(°0) exceeds c(®). The
asymptotic (1¡®) con¯dence interval for ° is the set of values of ° such that LR1(°) ·
c(®). Note that this con¯dence interval construction can produce highly asymmetric
con¯dence intervals for °.
The asymptotic distribution of the slope coe±cients ^ ¯ is more straightforward, although
the estimator ^ ¯ = ^ ¯(^ °) depends on the threshold estimate ^ °. Hansen (2000) shows that
inference on ¯ can proceed as if the threshold estimate ^ ° were the true value. Therefore,
empirical distribution to be used for bootstrapping. For the bootstrap procedure, the variable xit
and the threshold variable qit are given, i.e. their values are ¯xed in repeated bootstrap samples. We
take with replacement a sample of size NT from the empirical distribution and create a bootstrap
sample under the null hypothesis of no threshold. This bootstrap sample is used to estimate the
model under H0 and H1 and to calculate the bootstrap value of the likelihood ratio statistic F1
(12). This procedure is frequently repeated { 1000 bootstrap replications in our application { and
the bootstrap estimate of the asymptotic p-value for F1 under H0 is the percentage of draws for
which the simulated likelihod ratio statistic exceeds the actual statistic. The null hypothesis of no
threshold e®ect is rejected if the p-value is smaller than the desired signi¯cance level.
9 Hansen (1999) mentioned that the asymptotic approximation of the distribution of the likelihood
ratio statistic is likely to hold better for cases where ¯2 ¡¯1 is small than for cases where it is large.
However, if the threshold e®ect is large the threshold will be quite precisely estimated.
16^ ¯ is asymptotically normal with covariance matrix V estimated by
b V =
Ã
N X
i=1
T X
t=1
x¤
it(^ °)x¤
it(^ °)0
!¡1
^ ¾2:
4.2 Multiple thresholds
4.2.1 Estimating multiple thresholds
In many applications, there may be more than only one threshold. For example, there
are two thresholds accounting for non-linearities in the relationship between in°ation
and growth in Europe, see Cuaresma and Silgoner (2004). Fortunately, the testing
and estimation procedure by Hansen (1999, 2000) allows for the possibility of multiple
thresholds. In the following, we illustrate the methods for the double threshold model
since these methods extend in straightforward way to higher order threshold models.
The double threshold model has the form
yit = ®i + ¯0
1xitI(qit · °1) + ¯0
2xitI(°1 < qit · °2) + ¯0
3xitI(°2 < qit) + "it (14)
with °1 < °2. Equation (14) can be estimated by OLS, since for given thresholds
(14) is linear in slopes. The sum of squared residuals S(°1;°2) can be calculated
as in the single threshold model and the joint least squares estimates of (°1;°2) are
the values which jointly minimize S(°1;°2). Since a grid search over (°1;°2) requires
approximately (NT)2 regressions, it is important that { as Hansen (1999) demonstrates
{ sequential estimation is consistent.10 In the ¯rst stage, ^ °1 is the threshold estimate
which minimizes S1(°) de¯ned in (7). Given the ¯rst-stage estimate ^ °1, the criterion
for the second stage is in Hansen's (1999) notation given by
Sr
2(°2) =
½
S(^ °1;°2) if ^ °1 < °2
S(°2; ^ °1) if °2 < ^ °1
: (15)
The second-stage threshold estimate can then be written as
^ °r
2 = argmin
°2
Sr
2(°2): (16)
10 This result was found in the multiple changepoint model literature, see e.g. Bai (1997) or Bai and
Perron (1998).
17As Bai (1997) has shown, the estimator for °2 is asymptotically e±cient. However,
since ^ °1 was obtained from a sum of squared residuals function which neglects the
second threshold, ^ °1 is not e±cient. Bai (1997) suggests a third-stage estimation to get
an asymptotically e±cient estimator for °1. Holding the second-stage estimate ^ °r
2 ¯x,
the third-stage criterion is
Sr
1(°1) =
½
S(°1; ^ °r
2) if °1 < ^ °r
2
S(^ °r
2;°1) if ^ °r
2 < °1
: (17)
Then, the estimate for °1 is obtained by
^ °r
1 = argmin
°1
Sr
1(°1): (18)
4.2.2 Testing for the number of thresholds
Let us now determine the number of thresholds in a multiple threshold model. Again,
the procedure is illustrated in the double threshold model, since the generalization to
more than two thresholds is straightforward. In the single threshold model F1 in (12)
is obtained as the test statistic for a test of no thresholds against one threshold. If F1
rejects the null of no threshold, we need a further test to discriminate between one and
two thresholds. The minimized sum of squared errors from the second stage threshold
estimate ^ °r
2 is Sr
2(^ °r
2) with the variance estimate ^ ¾2 = Sr
2(^ °r
2)=N(T ¡ 1). Thus, the
likelihood ratio statistic for a test of one versus two thresholds is given by
F2 =
S1(^ °1) ¡ Sr
2(^ °r
2)
^ ¾2 : (19)
The null of one threshold is rejected if F2 is large. The bootstrap procedure to ap-
proximate the asymptotic p-value for the likelihood ratio test works as for the single-
threshold case. The threshold variable qit and the regressors xit are ¯xed in repeated
bootstrap samples. The bootstrap errors will be drawn from the residuals calculated
under the alternative hypothesis, i.e. from the residuals from least squares regression
of Equation (14). Speci¯cally, we draw (with replacement) error samples from the em-
pirical distribution, namely "
]
it. Now we generate the dependent variable y
]
it under the
18null hypothesis of one threshold using the equation
y
]
it = ^ ¯0
1xitI(qit · ^ °) + ^ ¯0
2xitI(qit > ^ °) + "
]
it: (20)
Equation (20) depends on the least squares estimates from the single threshold model
^ ¯1, ^ ¯2, and ^ °. The test statistic F2 can be calculated and repeating this procedure a
large number of times will provide the bootstrap p-value. Note that in the generalized
case the sequential testing sequence stops if e.g. the null of a maximum number of
(K ¡ 1) thresholds is rejected but the null of at most K thresholds is not.
4.2.3 Con¯dence Intervals
Following Bai (1997), the threshold estimators ^ °r
1 and ^ °r
2 have the same asymptotic
distributions as the threshold estimate in the single threshold model. Consequently,
the con¯dence intervals for the two threshold parameters are constructed in the same
way as in the single threshold case. We calculate
LRr
2(°) =
Sr
2(°) ¡ Sr
2(^ °r
2)
^ ¾2
and
LRr
1(°) =
Sr
1(°) ¡ Sr
1(^ °r
1)
^ ¾2
where Sr
2(°) and Sr
1(°) are de¯ned in (15) and (17), respectively. Then, the asymptotic
(1 ¡ ®) con¯dence regions for the threshold estimates are the set of values of ° with
LRr
2(°) · c(®) and LRr
1(°) · c(®).
5 In°ation thresholds and RPV: Empirical results for the
euro area
5.1 Model speci¯cation
In the following we apply the panel-threshold model reviewed in the previous section to
the analysis of the relationship between RPV and in°ation in the euro area. According
19to the evidence found in Section 2, we use the linear speci¯cation (2) that allows for
a di®erent impact of expected (¼e
it) and unexpected (¼it ¡ ¼e
it) core in°ation on RPV
as the starting point of our analysis. Thus, using the notation of the threshold model
introduced in Section 4, we have yit = RPVit and xit = (j¼e
itj;j¼it ¡ ¼e
itj).
In the next step, the threshold variable q has to be determined. Section 2 provided clear
evidence that core in°ation is the relevant measure of in°ation for RPV. Therefore, core
in°ation as threshold variable seems to be the most natural choice. In the following
we will therefore concentrate on the results obtained for qit = ¼it. Yet, it is worth
emphasizing that our major results are very robust with respect to alternative threshold
variables like headline in°ation or expected core in°ation, see Tables 6 and 7 in the
Appendix for detailed results.11
Finally, we have to determine whether expected and/or unexpected in°ation may have
a non-linear-threshold impact on RPV. Table 9 in the Appendix shows that the relation
between unexpected in°ation and RPV is linear. In the following, we therefore focus
on the more interesting results we obtained for the non-linear in°uence of expected
in°ation on RPV. To summarize the above speci¯cation issues and to establish some
notation, the speci¯cation of the threshold model employed in the following analysis is
as follows:
RPVit =®i +
K X
k=0
¯k+1j¼e
itjI(°k < ¼it · °k+1) + ±j¼it ¡ ¼e
itj + "it; (21)
where °0 = ¡1, °K+1 = 1, K is the number of thresholds and, thus, (K + 1) the
number of in°ation regimes.
11 If we use unexpected core in°ation as threshold variable to determine di®erent regimes for the e®ect
of expected core in°ation on RPV, the test for threshold e®ects arrives at the conclusion that there
is no threshold (Table 8). The same result of no threshold e®ect is obtained when we allow the
coe±cient on unexpected core in°ation to switch between regimes, see Table 9 in the Appendix.
20Table 3: Test procedure establishing the number of thresholds
RPVit = ®i +
PK
k=0 ¯k+1j¼e
itjI(°k < ¼it · °k+1) + ±j¼it ¡ ¼e
itj + "it
H0: no threshold (K=0)
F1 34.82
p-value 0.00
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (8.12, 9.85, 15.07)
H0: at most one threshold (K=1)
F2 13.94
p-value 0.01
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (7.88, 9.42, 13.19)
H0: at most two thresholds (K=2)
F3 3.34
p-value 0.59
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (6.95, 8.28, 11.68)
Notes: The threshold variable ¼it is monthly core in°ation. °0 = ¡1, °K+1 = 1. The
sequential test procedure indicates that the number of thresholds is K = 2. 1000 bootstrap
replications were used to obtain the p-values.
5.2 The number of in°ation thresholds
In order to determine the number of thresholds, the distinct values of the threshold
variable core in°ation are sorted. To ensure a minimum number of observations in each
threshold regime, we restrict the search to values of monthly core in°ation such that
not less than 5% of the observations, i.e. at least 41 observations, lie in each regime, see
e.g. Hansen (1999) or Cuaresma and Silgoner (2004). The remaining values of monthly
core in°ation (beginning with ¡0:1149 and ending with 0:5112) constitute the values
of ° which can be searched for ^ °. As described in Section 4, Equation (21) is estimated
by least squares and the sum of squared residuals (7) is calculated for each value of
core in°ation. The value that minimizes (7) yields the estimate ^ °.12
12 The GAUSS program underlying this analysis is based on the GAUSS code by Bruce Hansen which
is available from his homepage (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/»bhansen/).
21Table 4: A double threshold model for the in°ation-RPV link
RPVit = ®i + ¯1j¼
e
itjI(¼it · °1) + ¯2j¼
e
itjI(°1 < ¼it · °2) + ¯3j¼
e
itjI(°2 < ¼it) + ±j¼it ¡ ¼
e
itj + "it
Threshold estimates
b °1 -0.1149
95% con¯dence interval [-0.1149, -0.0996]
b °2 0.4948
95% con¯dence interval [0.2401, 0.5112]
Regression estimates
b ¯1 1:38
(0:20)
¤¤
b ¯2 0:05
(0:10)
b ¯3 0:50
(0:12)
¤¤
b ± 0:86
(0:08)
¤¤
SSR 48.74
Observations in regime 1 41
Observations in regime 2 739
Observations in regime 3 50
Notes: The threshold variable ¼it is monthly core in°ation. Standard errors are given in parentheses,
p-values in brackets.
¤¤ indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level.
The test statistics F1, F2 (see (12) and (19)), and F3 together with their asymptotic
bootstrap p-values are shown in Table 3. According to the p-value associated to F1,
the null of no threshold e®ects can be rejected at the 1% level. The test statistic
for a double threshold F2 is also highly signi¯cant with a bootstrap p-value of 0:01.
However, the test statistic for a third threshold (F3) is far from being statistically
signi¯cant. Therefore, the sequential test procedure implies two thresholds and, thus,
three in°ation regimes in the in°ation-RPV relation for the euro area.
225.3 Estimating the in°ation thresholds and the slope coe±cients
The estimated thresholds and the 95% con¯dence intervals are reported in the upper
part of Table 4. The point estimates of the two thresholds for monthly core in°ation
are ¡0:1149 and 0:4948. Note that ¡0:1149 for the threshold °1 is the smallest feasible
threshold value having restricted the search for thresholds to values of ° such that 5% of
the observations lie in each regime. Therefore, the regime ¼it · ^ °1 contains exactly 41
observations and the lower bound of the 95% con¯dence interval is the threshold value
itself. By contrast, the second threshold lies strictly within the con¯dence interval. The
upper bound for the second threshold con¯dence interval is the last value of monthly
core in°ation being available for searching on ^ °.13
The di®erent estimates (^ ¯1, ^ ¯2, ^ ¯3) for the marginal impact of expected in°ation in
the three in°ation regimes can be found in the lower part of Table 4. The coe±cient
of unexpected core in°ation (^ ±) - the variable not switching between the regimes -
on RPV is positive and highly signi¯cant. In contrast, the signi¯cant linear relation
between expected in°ation and RPV presented in Section 2 is attributed to the positive
impact of expected in°ation if in°ation is either very high or very low. Speci¯cally,
the expected in°ation coe±cients on the regimes 'very low in°ation' and 'very high
in°ation' are highly signi¯cant while the coe±cient on the intermediate regime (^ ¯2)
is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. RPV reacts positively (^ ¯3 = 0:5) to expected
in°ation if monthly core in°ation exceeds 0:4948%, i.e. if annualized core in°ation is
higher than 5:94%. As the 95% con¯dence interval for monthly in°ation indicates, the
estimated value of this upper in°ation threshold exceeds 2:88% p.a. Expected in°ation
has the strongest marginal impact on RPV (^ ¯1 = 1:38) if core in°ation is lower than
¡0:1149%, i.e. ¡1:38% p.a.14 A linear speci¯cation underestimates the role of expected
13 If we allow for a minimum number of observations lying in each regime of only 2.5% or 1%, the
estimated lower threshold decreases and the large threshold increases. Since the estimated coe±cients
of expected in°ation increase slightly with the absolute value of the thresholds, it seems that RPV
reacts non-linear to in°ation even within the regimes. This suggests that a smooth transition model
might provide an alternative speci¯cation of the non-linear relation between in°ation and RPV.
14 Note that threshold ^ °1 is indeed the ¯rst threshold determined by the sequential test procedure.
23in°ation for RPV in case of very high and very low in°ation levels.
It is worth emphasizing that our results are robust with respect to the choice of the
threshold variable. For example, as Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix show, there are also
two thresholds if the threshold variable is expected core in°ation or headline in°ation.
In all these variants of the threshold model, the general conclusion remains: there is
only a signi¯cant impact of expected in°ation on RPV if in°ation is either very low or
very high supporting price stability as an outcome of optimal monetary policy.
6 Conclusion
The e®ects of in°ation on the welfare of an economy are manifold. In particular,
according to the new Keynesian macroeconomic literature price dispersion is responsible
for real e®ects of in°ation. In°ation increases relative price variability (RPV), distorts
the information content of nominal prices and, thereby, impedes an e±cient allocation
of resources. This paper examines the empirical relationship between in°ation and
RPV in the euro area focusing on threshold e®ects of in°ation. Speci¯cally, we employ
the panel threshold model proposed by Hansen (1999, 2000) since it allows to estimate
the number of thresholds as well as the threshold values itself.
The results for the euro area reveal that the impact of expected in°ation on RPV is
hump-shaped. Expected in°ation increases RPV if core in°ation is either very low
(< ¡1:38% p.a.) or very high (> 5:94% p.a.). Between these two thresholds expected
in°ation has no real e®ects on the economy via its impact on RPV. Therefore, threshold
e®ects of in°ation provide a further rational for the announcement of critical levels of
in°ation and in°ation target zones.
A similar threshold e®ect of in°ation is also found in the in°ation-growth literature,
Recall that in a double threshold model the lower threshold is not necessarily the ¯rst estimated
threshold. This con¯rms the importance of the pronounced low-in°ation-e®ect. In particular, there
is only evidence for a single low in°ation threshold if each regime has to contain at least 10% of all
observations.
24see e.g. Cuaresma and Silgoner (2004). They ¯nd a hump-shaped impact of in°ation
on long-term growth in Europe, i.e. the relationship between in°ation and growth is
signi¯cant for low in°ation rates, insigni¯cant thereafter and again signi¯cant for high-
in°ation levels. However, Cuaresma and Silgoner (2004) estimate an upper threshold of
in°ation of around 16% p.a. which seems to be of limited relevance for current monetary
policy in industrial countries. In contrast, the upper threshold level in the in°ation-
RPV relationship ranges between 3% and 6% p.a. con¯rming that price stability should
be the outcome of optimal monetary policy.
Of course, threshold models may only provide a crude approximation of a very complex
non-linear relation. Further steps in the empirical analysis of the non-linear impact of
in°ation on RPV might include the application of smooth transition models which
have already been introduced by Tsionas and Christopoulos (2003) into the empirical
in°ation-growth literature.
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29A Appendix
A.1 Data ¯gures
Figure 3: Headline in°ation and RPV
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Notes: Annualized in°ation rates and annualized RPV (percentage points, seasonally
adjusted) confer to the harmonized index of consumer prices, 1995.02{2003.12. Source:
Eurostat.
30Figure 4: Headline in°ation and core in°ation
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Notes: Annualized core in°ation rates and annualized aggregate in°ation (percentage
points, seasonally adjusted) confer to the harmonized index of consumer prices, 1996.02{
2003.12. Source: Eurostat.
31Figure 5: Distribution of national core in°ation rates in the euro area
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Figure 6: Minimum and maximum of core in°ation
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32A.2 Tables
A.2.1 Panel unit root tests
Table 5: Panel unit root tests
In°ation Core In°ation RPV
H0: common unit root process
Levin, Lin, Chu ¡29:17
[0:00]
¡16:30
[0:00]
¡24:48
[0:00]
Breitung ¡12:60
[0:00]
¡6:01
[0:00]
¡15:80
[0:00]
H0: individual unit root process
Im, Pesaran, Shin ¡25:89
[0:00]
¡17:74
[0:00]
¡22:39
[0:00]
ADF-Fisher 490:22
[0:00]
210:82
[0:00]
427:14
[0:00]
PP-Fisher 561:11
[0:00]
290:24
[0:00]
495:61
[0:00]
Notes: The Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test and the Breitung (2000) test assume that there
is a common unit root process under the null. Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) as well as the
Fisher-ADF and Fisher-Phillips-Perron test by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001),
respectively, allow for individual unit root processes. All tests choose the lags based on the
Schwarz information criterion. In all tests there is clear evidence in form of stationarity of
in°ation, core in°ation, and RPV.
33A.2.2 Expected core in°ation and headline in°ation as threshold variable
Table 6: Test for the number of thresholds with alternative threshold variables
RPVit = ®i +
PK
k=0 ¯k+1j¼e
itjI(°k < xit · °k+1) + ±j¼it ¡ ¼e
itj + "it
expected core in°ation headline in°ation
H0: no threshold (K=0)
F1 71.56 84.05
p-value 0.00 0.00
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (7.77, 9.94, 16.09) (7.93, 9.66, 15.03)
H0: at most one threshold (K=1)
F2 12.80 61.09
p-value 0.01 0.00
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (8.45, 9.71, 12.43) (8.15, 9.63, 13.98)
H0: at most two thresholds (K=2)
F3 5.28 2.66
p-value 0.54 0.73
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (9.12, 10.75, 13.78) (7.59, 9.03, 13.40)
Notes: The threshold variable xit is monthly expected core in°ation or monthly headline in°ation. 1000
bootstrap replications were used to obtain the p-values. °0 = ¡1, °K+1 = 1. The sequential test
procedure indicates that the number of thresholds for both expected core in°ation and headline in°ation
is K = 2.
34Table 7: A double threshold model with alternative threshold variables
RPVit = ®i + ¯1j¼
e
itjI(xit · °1) + ¯2j¼
e
itjI(°1 < xit · °2) + ¯3j¼
e
itjI(°2 < xit) + ±j¼it ¡ ¼
e
itj + "it
expected core in°ation headline in°ation
Threshold estimates
b °1 0.0441 -0.0887
95% con¯dence interval [0.0047, 0.0541] [-0.0972, -0.0777]
b °2 0.3671 0.4687
95% con¯dence interval [0.1662, 0.3854] [0.4655, 0.4694]
Regression estimates
b ¯1 1:86
(0:22)
¤¤ 1:60
(0:17)
¤¤
b ¯2 ¡0:09
(0:11)
¡0:08
(0:09)
b ¯3 0:26
(0:09)
¤¤ 0:66
(0:11)
¤¤
b ± 1:04
(0:07)
¤¤ 0:97
(0:07)
¤¤
SSR 46.79 43.62
Observations in regime 1 81 59
Observations in regime 2 697 691
Observations in regime 3 52 80
Notes: The threshold variable xit is monthly expected core in°ation or monthly headline in°ation. Stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses, p-values in brackets.
¤¤ indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level.
35A.2.3 Unexpected in°ation as threshold variable
Table 8: Test procedure establishing the number of thresholds for expected in°ation
RPVit = ®i +
PK
k=0 ¯k+1j¼e
itjI(°k < (¼it ¡ ¼e
it) · °k+1) + ±j¼it ¡ ¼e
itj + "it
H0: no threshold (K=0)
F1 8.67
p-value 0.07
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (7.66, 9.45, 14.28)
H0: at most one threshold (K=1)
F2 2.79
p-value 0.71
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (7.74, 9.60, 13.97)
Notes: The threshold variable is unexpected in°ation. 1000 bootstrap replications were used to obtain
the p-values. °0 = ¡1, °K+1 = 1. The sequential test procedure indicates that there is no threshold
(K = 0).
Table 9: Test procedure establishing the number of thresholds for unexpected in°ation
RPVit = ®i + ¯1j¼e
itjI(¼it · ¡0:11) + ¯2j¼e
itjI(¡0:11 < ¼it · 0:49) + ¯3j¼e
itjI(0:49 < ¼it)
+
PK
k=0 ±k+1j¼it ¡ ¼e
itjI(°k < (¼it ¡ ¼e
it) · °k+1) + "it
H0: no threshold (K=0)
F1 3.39
p-value 0.27
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (5.64, 7.27, 10.49)
H0: at most one threshold (K=1)
F2 4.72
p-value 0.47
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (9.63, 11.60, 16.03)
Notes: The threshold variable is unexpected in°ation. 1000 bootstrap replications were used to obtain
the p-values. °0 = ¡1, °K+1 = 1. The sequential test procedure indicates that there is no threshold
(K = 0).
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